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Multiple Agency Perspective, Family Control and Private Information Abuse in an 
Emerging Market 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how 
family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging markets. 
We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple 
agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the Board increases the 
risk of private information abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock-market 
performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to distort information disclosure 
to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency 
roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors’ 
perceptions of private information abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of 
the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control within a multiple agency 
perspective. 
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Introduction 
Although the financial community and regulators in emerging markets make substantial 
efforts to improve investors’ confidence by setting new accounting and disclosure rules that 
reflect international standards of good practice, recent scandals and corporate failures, such as 
Satyam in India, Citic Pacific in China and SK Networks in South Korea, highlight the failure 
of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms to improve corporate transparency and 
mitigate widespread private information abuses within less developed stock markets. In the 
finance literature, private information is defined as the difference between the information sets 
available to the firm’s insiders, informed investors and un-informed investors who assesses 
whether the company share price is undervalued or overvalued in the stock market (Easley 
and O'Hara 2004). There are different types of private information abuses such as informal 
flows of information between well-connected investors and managers of firms in their 
portfolios, managerial dealings on insider information or information manipulation, etc. When 
investors suspect that the firm’s management is prone to abuse private information, they will 
price-protect themselves by increasing the firm’s cost of capital, which negatively affects the 
firm valuation and shareholder wealth. Despite the intensive academic and public debate on 
the possible negative effects of private information exchanges on corporate transparency 
(Beny 2007) and ultimately, performance, very little is known about the internal corporate 
governance factors that may affect the extent of private information abuse. Our paper aims to 
address these conceptual and empirical gaps. 
A growing body of research in economics and management is focused on the effects of 
corporate governance on firm performance in emerging markets (see Filatotchev, Jackson, 
Gospel and Allcock, 2007, for a review). Agency research, for example, has established an 
association between concentrated ownership in emerging markets with private benefit of 
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control (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; Morck, 1996; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton 
and Jiang, 2008).  These private benefits of control are usually assumed to be part of the 
opaque information environment, which leads to abuses of private access to information by 
insiders (Peng and Jiang, 2010).  However, how the exploitation of private information 
creates a possible channel to obtain these benefits, as well as the governance role of 
controlling shareholders in general, and family owners in particular, in terms of insider 
information abuses in an emerging market environment, remain relatively unexplored. More 
specifically, little is known about the effects of family ownership and control of corporate 
boards on the risk of private information abuse. In addition, there is a dearth of research on 
performance outcomes of reduced corporate transparency, or rather corporate opacity. By 
addressing these theoretical and empirical gaps, our analysis may help to inform both 
investment and regulatory processes in emerging markets. 
 Corporate governance research on disclosure focuses on the relation between corporate 
governance mechanisms and disclosure decisions or disclosure quality (Claessens and Fan 
2002; Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008). This research emphasizes that information is prepared 
by management, endorsed by the audit committee, approved by the board, audited by external 
auditors and circulated among investors via various channels. Therefore, various governance 
factors, such as board composition and distribution of ownership and control, should have a 
non-trivial effect on the extent and content of information disclosure by senior management 
and their incentives and ability to abuse private access to information. It is natural to suggest 
that the firm’s governance characteristics should influence investors’ expectations with regard 
to the private information environment of individual firms and, ultimately, their behaviour in 
placing orders. These orders subsequently lead to trades and affect the price discovery process 
in the stock market and, ultimately, firm value. However, previous governance research does 
not consider the risks of private information abuse associated with informed and uninformed 
 5
trading. Therefore, there is a need combine corporate governance and market microstructure 
research and integrate these two separate lines of enquiry to develop a better understanding of 
how different agency effects influence the risk of firm-level private information abuse and 
firm performance. 
By combining multiple agency perspective with market microstructure research, this 
paper investigates complex inter-relationships between family ownership and private 
information abuse risk in an emerging market. It extends previous studies in a number of 
ways. First, it aims to explore the governance effects of family control on firm performance 
by considering private information disclosure as an important transmission mechanism from 
family control to organisational outcomes. We argue that risks of private information abuse 
are associated not only with general firm characteristics, such as size, complexity, etc., but 
also with governance parameters, including ownership structure and board composition. 
Second, this examination allows us to expand and contextualise nascent understanding of the 
multiple agency perspective (e.g., Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busentiz and Johnson, 2008; Bruton, 
Filatotchev, Chahine and Wright, 2010) which moves away from a simplistic principal-agent 
dichotomy and considers the multiple governance roles of the same participants in the firm’s 
governance mechanism. Previous studies of the effects of corporate governance on disclosure 
are focused on potential conflicts between managers and dispersed, minority shareholders. In 
this setting, managerial self-serving may distort information disclosure when top managers try 
to extract personal rents from organisational opacity (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Lambert 
2001). However, firms in many emerging markets are characterised by high levels on 
non-managerial share ownership. The presence of large block-holders, who often represent a 
founding family, create a multiple agency setting that include agency conflicts between largest 
family shareholders and managers; between managers and minority shareholders; and 
between family shareholders and minority shareholders (Claessens and Fan 2002; Filatotchev, 
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Lien and Piesse, 2005). As large block-holders, family shareholders can monitor managerial 
disclosure decisions and improve transparency for themselves as well as for the minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). They may also have incentives to extract private 
benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders using private information within 
less transparent corporate structures (Morck, 1996). This paper explores how family owners 
choose the optimal transparency level that maximises their own interests bearing in mind a 
trade-off between benefits of increased transparency and costs of releasing private information 
in terms of losing some private benefits of control (Verrecchia 2001). Third, in the context of 
multiple agency conflicts, we link private information abuse risk to firm performance. This 
puts this paper among the first studies that try to explain various channels used by dominant 
shareholders to extract private benefits of control. We contribute to this research by focusing 
on insider information as a valuable commodity in an emerging market environment.  
Finally, we test our theoretical assumptions using the population sample of firms listed in 
Hong-Kong. Although this paper focuses on a single market, the Hong Kong stock exchange 
is a model for many emerging economies. At the same time, it allows us to analyse corporate 
governance effects on information disclosure and performance in situations where top 
managers are frequently family members; where controlling families are also represented on 
the board; and where they are often the major providers of capital, if not directly, then through 
relational holdings in other firms (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan, 2003, Filatotchev, Strange, 
Piesse and Lien, 2007).  At the same time, family-controlled firms that are listed on the stock 
exchange also have minority shareholders to whom managers are accountable, and 
governance effects of family control on information disclosure and performance is therefore 
an important research issue. Finally, an improvement in reporting and disclosure standards 
and high levels of transparency in the market trading environment in Hong Kong presents an 
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opportunity for a rigorous empirical study using a combination of firm-level and market 
trading data.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & HYPOTHESES 
The effect of family control on private information abuse risk 
Within economics and corporate finance, a substantial body of research has focused on the 
governance roles of dominant family owners, especially in the environment of emerging and 
less developed economies (Claessens et al., 2000). Few empirical studies consider 
organisational performance of publicly owned, family controlled firms directly, although 
Claessens et al. (2000) confirms that a large proportion of listed companies are still under 
family control in a number of countries in East Asia. Clearly, this is the common model of 
corporate governance in the region (Bruton et al., 2003; Peng and Zhou, 2005). At the same 
time, corporate control in East Asia is largely dependent on a pyramid ownership structure 
with equity cross-holding amongst associated firms making the separation of ownership and 
control very unlikely. With a high overlap between controlling family and management, 
discipline towards management is weak and the opportunity for shareholder expropriation 
commonplace (Filatotchev et al., 2005).   
The model of the family-owned business has been the subject of numerous studies (see 
Filatotchev et al., 2007, for a review). Agency-based research suggests that family owners 
may have superior monitoring abilities compared to diffused shareholders, especially when 
this is combined with family control over management and the boards of firms (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004). Because owners in the current generation have the tendency and obligation to 
preserve wealth for the next, family firms often possess longer time horizons compared to 
non-family firms (Bruton et al., 2003). Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) suggest that these 
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characteristics can alleviate agency conflicts between the firms’ debt and equity claimants and 
reduce the agency costs of debt. Heugens, Essen and Oosterhout (2009) present a 
meta-analysis of the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm financial 
performance in Asia that finds a positive association between both variables. Thus, family 
firms represent a special class of large shareholders that may have a unique incentive 
structure, a strong voice in the firm, and provide powerful motivation for managers.  
A number of researchers express concerns about the governance problems associated with 
family control and the increased likelihood of the abuse of power (Jiang and Peng, 2010). 
Research from North America (e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988, Smith and 
Amoako-Adu, 1999) and South-East Asia (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2005; 2007) provides 
evidence of the negative effect of a controlling family on corporate performance. This 
suggests that family interests may dominate over the interests of non-family shareholders, 
since the concentration of personal and family wealth in family-controlled firms normally 
creates a preference for wealth distribution towards dominant owners over other dimensions 
of firm performance, such as maximisation of dividend payments to outside shareholders 
(Carney and Gedajlovic, 2003). Finally, family control tends to shield a firm from the 
disciplinary pressure of the market for corporate control since concentrated share ownership 
reduces the probability of a hostile take-over (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri, 
2003). Young et al. (2008) review and synthesize recent research on principal-principal 
conflicts in many emerging economies with an emphasis on their institutional antecedents and 
organizational consequences. This emphasises the significance of principal-principal conflicts 
as an important but often overlooked problem in corporate governance. More specifically, 
Peng and Jiang (2010) theorize that whether the impact of family ownership and control on 
firm value is good, bad or irrelevant depends on the level of shareholder protection embodied 
in the legal and regulatory institutions and these vary across countries. They suggest that in 
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countries with less developed institutions more control through a family CEO or pyramid 
structure may afford controlling families more opportunities to expropriate funds from 
minority shareholders. However, very few studies focus on the effects of family control on the 
risk of private information abuse. 
Agency arguments suggest that in emerging markets, family shareholders should have a 
strong incentive to distort public disclosure and mislead minority shareholders in order to gain 
private benefits of control (Anderson, Duru and Reeb, 2009; Chin, Kleinman, Lee and Lin, 
2006; Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001; Lang, Lins and Miller, 2004). For example, to facilitate 
their tunnelling activities and transfer private benefits of control, family owners in Hong Kong 
often fail to meet the minimum requirements set by the Hong Kong stock exchange with 
regard to transaction disclosure (Ho 2003). Fan and Wong (2002) find that the quality of 
public disclosure deteriorates when family owners control more voting rights than cash-flow 
rights in the company.  
These arguments suggest that high family ownership increases the firm’s information 
opacity and stimulates the collection of private information by informed, sophisticated 
investors (Diamond 1985; Verrecchia 2001) leading to higher private information abuse risk 
faced by uninformed investors. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
 
H1: Family ownership is positively associated with the risk of private information abuse 
in an emerging market 
 
Besides ownership, corporate governance research and organization studies 
increasingly recognise that boards of directors have a central role in reducing agency 
problems, and the board structure and characteristics may influence strategic decisions, 
including information disclosure (Zahra and Pearce 1989). Effective monitoring and service 
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roles are usually a function of structural factors such as the proportion of independent 
directors on the board (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). A number of studies try to link board 
characteristics directly to firm performance. For example, in his study of boards of the largest 
firms in China, Peng (2004) documents a positive relationship between the presence of 
independent directors and firm performance. However, there is a paucity of studies that 
explore inter-relationships between board characteristics and private information disclosure.   
Specific characteristics of corporate boards in large firms in emerging markets bring 
new and interesting dimensions to this research on the governance role of boards. Existing 
studies on corporate governance in family-controlled firms in South and East Asia suggest 
that family members often dominate the boards of directors by nominating family members on 
to the board (Filatotchev et al., 2005; Bruton et al., 2003). In this environment, agency 
analysis of performance outcomes of board independence from the CEO and other executives 
that dominated research in the US and other developed economies becomes less relevant. 
Instead, the focus shifts towards studying organizational outcomes of directors’ independence 
from controlling families (Filatotchev et al., 2005).   
Filatotchev et al. (2005) argues that family control over the board may lead to greater 
executive entrenchment and potential agency conflicts with outside investors, in particular 
with public market shareholders that may suffer from a high level of information asymmetry. 
For example, Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) test the role of independent boards of 
directors in preventing the manipulation of earnings statements. Results suggest that an 
independent board and audit members, especially those with appropriate areas of expertise, 
effectively lower the discretionary current accruals showing in corporate financial reports. In 
an opaque environment, control over the firm’s board as an additional control-enhancing 
mechanism can provide family shareholders with enhanced power to pursue their private 
objectives. Family shareholders with more power are more likely to make their firms more 
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opaque, leading to an increase in private information abuse risk in the stock market. 
According to agency arguments, a lack of independent directors can compromise the board 
monitoring function (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Boeker and Goodstein 1993; Li 1994; 
Weisbach 1988; Zajac and Westphal 1996). Thus, family that are dominant on the board can 
entrench themselves and are not liable to being disciplined by other independent directors. 
This makes it easier for the largest family shareholders to create opportunistic opacity and 
exploit this to obtain private benefits of control. Based on the analysis above, it is proposed 
that: 
 
H2: Family dominance on the board is positively associated with the risk of private 
information abuse in an emerging market.  
 
 Our previous arguments were focused on agency conflicts between controlling families 
and minority investors within the context of private information abuse risk. However, the 
multiple agency perspective suggests that both controlling families and minority investors 
may be exposed to a different set of agency costs that may be associated with managerial 
opportunism. Ultimately, it is managers that decide how much and what kind of information 
the firm discloses publicly, and they may pursue their own interests when making this 
decision. Without controlling the top level of the decision-making hierarchy, family 
shareholders have to bear costs of managerial opportunism just as minority investors. 
Therefore, the risk of private information abuse also depends on whether the family takes 
control of the top leadership within the firm, such as the CEO and/or board’s Chairman.  
Within the multiple agency perspective, it is not clear which agency conflict will 
dominate the family’s preferences with regard to information disclosure. Within the 
principal-principal agency conflict, the board leadership may enhance the power of the 
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controlling family, leading to a stronger incentive to extract private benefits of control. Being 
related to a controlling family, the CEO and Chairman are less likely to be removed by 
minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). By appointing senior executives, the 
family may have incentives to extract higher benefits of control by increasing the firm’s 
opacity vis-à-vis minority shareholders.   
However, when leadership positions are occupied by family members, the disclosure 
preferences of family owners and minority shareholders may become more aligned when 
confronted by the threat of managerial opportunism. Compared to externally appointed 
managers with low levels of equity in the firm, family shareholders have a higher preference 
for corporate transparency since any price discount due to adverse selection problems would 
cause a significant loss in the family’s wealth. Family leadership, therefore, provides an 
opportunity to directly monitor managerial decisions with regard to private information 
disclosure by, for example, restraining managerial dealings in insider information. In addition, 
social pressures within the family may prevent family-affiliated managers from dealing in 
private information. Family leadership can also improve the ability of the board to process 
information and lower uncertainties when managers make public disclosure decisions. This 
further improves the quality of public disclosure and lowers both the benefits of private 
information collection by outside speculators and overall private information abuse risk faced 
by uninformed investors (Zhang 2001). Family leadership can improve the ability of the board 
to process information not only because family shareholders are informed about the firm’s 
operations, R&D and other strategic issues (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Gomes-Mejia et 
al. 2003), but also because they internalise information flows between management and the 
board, which can reduce any risk of misunderstanding and poor strategic decision-making.  
Based on the analysis above, there are compelling reasons to believe that enhanced 
monitoring associated with the family’s control over board leadership should lead to a 
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reduction of principal-agent conflict associated with information disclosure, and its benefits 
may be higher that potential costs of the family’s entrenchment. Hence, we suggest the 
following:   
 
H3: Family board leadership is negatively associated with the risk of private information 
abuse in an emerging market. 
 
Private Information Abuse Risk and Stock Market Performance 
Our previous arguments suggest that family control over firm ownership and the board 
reduces transparency to the public market investors, and leads to increasing levels of private 
information abuse risk. If family entrenchment dominates private information abuse risk, 
investors would recognise this and price-protect themselves against family opportunism. 
Therefore, private information abuse risk should have a negative impact on firm value. In an 
increasingly opaque information environment, largest family shareholders become even more 
entrenched (Anderson et al. 2009). Investors recognise the risk of being expropriated by 
family shareholders in a firm with high levels of informed trading. First, in an environment of 
poor information disclosure that exists in many emerging markets, uninformed investors may 
assume that all incremental private information is negative, given the adverse selection 
hypothesis (Akerlof 1970). As a result, to acquire stock in companies with higher information 
abuse risk, they would require a higher rate of return or a higher discount on the share price 
(Easley and O'Hara, 2004). The multiple agency framework outlines various agency conflicts 
associated with information asymmetries between controlling families, minority shareholders 
and managers. Therefore, these conflicts of interest should lead to a negative relationship 
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between the overall private information abuse risk and the performance of the firm in the 
stock market. Hence: 
 
H4: The risk of private information abuse is negatively associated with the firm’s stock 
market performance.  
METHODS  
Sample 
We focused on companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) since it provides 
an excellent laboratory to explore the agency effects of family owners on private information 
abuse risk in an emerging market. Hong Kong is characterised by a high level of ownership 
concentration in listed companies, and the communication of information is facilitated mainly 
through private channels, meaning that both strategic and operational information can be 
easily hidden by insiders. Information exchanges between firms and investors are dominated 
by networks, or Chinese guanxi, with information asymmetry problems being more likely 
resolved through private communication channels, leaving individual minority shareholders 
largely uninformed. In addition, Stoll and Whaley (1990) and O'Hara (2001) indicate that the 
HKSE can mitigate market noise and emphasise the importance of firm-level corporate 
governance factors in explaining private information abuse risk because of the size, quality 
and structure of this particular market. Amongst East Asia countries, the HKSE that has been 
established since 1891 is generally considered to have the highest quality in the region. It is 
classified by the International Finance Corporation as a developed stock market, with the sixth 
largest total capitalisation in the world and the second largest total capitalisation in East Asia 
after Japan (Comerton-Forde and Rydge 2006). As an order-driven, non-specialist market, the 
HKSE mitigates private information abuse risk associated with market-makers’ monopoly 
 15
power1 and provides an opportunity to observe order imbalance and identification. Finally, 
concentrated ownership in Hong Kong-listed firms represents a more general phenomenon 
associated with ownership structures in emerging economies, and our research results may be 
generalised to other parts of the world. Although HKSE has insider trading laws, prosecution 
is infrequent and enforcement is ineffective, again reflecting similar situations in other 
emerging economies (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002). 
To test our hypotheses, data on all 812 companies listed on the HKSE (Main Board) in 
2006 were collected. Following common practice, financial institutions (e.g., firms with 
two-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67) were omitted. We removed 164 companies with missing 
data for the control variables. We also removed 54 companies with corner solutions for the 
variable of private information abuse risk and extreme values for control variables. The final 
sample consists of 447 companies. In terms of industrial distribution, this includes 51 firms 
(11.41% of the total) from building and construction, 40 firms (8.95%) from the electronic 
and electrical equipment industry, 27 firms (6.04%) from wholesale trade in durable goods, 20 
firms (4.47%) from the chemicals industry, 20 firms (4.47%) from business services and 16 
firms (3.58%) from the communications sector. The rest of the sample is widely distributed 
across other industries.  
Measurement 
Because of its very nature, risk of private information abuse is essentially unobservable. Prior 
finance studies use a number of proxies to evaluate this, such as spread, analyst coverage, 
 
1Designated Market Makers are also known as Specialists, who act as the official market maker for a given security. In return 
for a) providing a required amount of liquidity to the security's market, b) taking the other side of trades when there are 
short-term buy-and-sell-side imbalances in customer orders, and c) attempting to prevent excess volatility, the specialists are 
granted various informational and trade execution advantages. In the United States, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) have a single exchange member as the specialist. Other U.S. exchanges, most 
prominently the NASDAQ Stock Exchange, employ several competing official market makers in a security. On the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) there are official market makers for many securities (but not for shares in the largest and most heavily 
traded companies, which instead use an automated system called TradElect). Most other stock exchanges including HKEX 
operate on a matched bargain or order driven basis. In such a system there are no designated or official market makers. 
 16
abnormal accruals, earnings informativeness and opacity index (Anderson et al. 2009; Lang et 
al. 2004; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Warfield, Wild and Wild, 1995; Callan, Lee and Yahn 
1997). In this paper, private information abuse risk is measured by the possibility of informed 
trading in a company share that contains private information (PIN). PIN is estimated using the 
model developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara, (1997b). While it is not possible to identify 
exactly who are informed traders of private information, the presence of private information 
in the market can be inferred from large imbalances between the number of buy and sell 
orders. On an ordinary trading day without private information releases, trade orders from 
buyers and sellers are roughly matched and balanced. However, when private information is 
obtained by some market participants, there will be a large imbalance in the order flow, with 
buyer- or seller-initiated trades playing a predominate role. These imbalances form the basis 
for the market microstructure model of information asymmetry. Although Venter and Jongh 
(2006) suggest an extension of the PIN model which improves the ability to fit the observed 
trading data patterns, calculations and estimations become much more complicated. Although 
the PIN model may bias downwards the possibility of detecting the risk of private information 
abuse (Boehmer, Gramming and Theissen 2006), it will not invalidate the results in this paper. 
We follow Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1997a), Easley et al. (1997b), and Easley, Kiefer, 
O'Hara and Paperman (1996) who suggest an empirical model that provides specific estimates 
of the risks of information-based trading. They show that the maximum likelihood estimator 
can solve the structural model’s parameters simultaneously using daily numbers of buy and 
sell orders to calculate the PIN measure as a proxy for private information abuse risk. This 
model requires daily numbers of buy and sell orders for a minimum of 40 trading days 
(Easley, O’Hara and Paperman, 1998) to generate reliable private information abuse risk 
estimation without incurring any sample selection concerns. Therefore, high frequency trade 
transaction data and bid-ask data for Hong Kong-listed companies from April 1 2006 to Jun 
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30 2006 were obtained directly from the HKSE to explore the presence of informed trading in 
the stock market. This period was relatively tranquil and did not have any dramatic shocks 
that may have affected the pricing of stocks.  
In our research, each trade is specified as buyer- or seller-initiated using the standard 
Lee–Ready algorithm (Lee and Ready 1991). The algorithm classifies any trade that takes 
place above (below) the midpoint of the current quoted spread as a buy (sell) because trades 
originating from buyers (sellers) are most likely to be executed at or near the ask (bid). For 
trades taking place at the midpoint, a tick test based on the most recent transaction price is 
used to classify the trade. Large trades are often broken down and matched against multiple 
investors. Following Hasbrouck (1988), all trades occurring within 5 seconds of each other are 
classified as a single trade. Thus, using real-time trades and bid-ask data in a single firm’s 
stock and using the maximum likelihood estimator, we are able to find the Balanced Trade 
level for buyers and sellers on all ordinary trading days (BT), Abnormal Trade level when 
private information is obtained by some market participants (AT), and the Possibility that 
some market participants can get access to private information (P). Therefore we can 
construct a proxy for the release of private information using BT, AT and P and calculate PIN 
based on the formula:  PIN= [P*AT]/[P*AT+BT].  
Compared with alternative proxies of private information, the PIN provides a more direct 
and comprehensive measure of private information abuse risk that is stable in the long-term. 
For example, PIN is better than spread-based proxies of information asymmetry because 
spread is more likely to capture the short term factors associated with responses of a dealer’s 
inventory to the order imbalance rather than long term information asymmetry factors 
(Callahan et al., 1997; Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans, 1997). In addition, the PIN 
method avoids econometric problems and interpretation difficulties that are associated with 
spread-based measures of information asymmetry (Callahan et al. 1997; Neal and Wheatley 
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1998; O'Hara 1995)2. PIN is also better than other proxies for private information used in 
earlier accounting and finance literatures, such as analyst coverage (Lang et al. 2004; Lang 
and Lundholm 1996), abnormal accruals and earnings informativeness (Warfield et al. 1995), 
and Opacity Index (Anderson et al. 2009).  This is, because it captures more private 
information abuse risk by using information on decisions of all stock market participants 
rather than individual analysts’ forecasts, and it clearly focuses on private information abuse 
risk as the ultimately outcome of a firm’s public disclosure decision. Finally, PIN is more 
effective than other measures because it represents a reliable and stable firm information 
structure that captures long term private information abuse risk in the stock market (Easley, 
Hvidkjaer and O'Hara, 2002). In the empirical work of Easley et al (2002), the estimated PIN 
is very stable across sample years from 1983-1998, both individually and in the cross-section. 
This is considered to be strong evidence that PIN captures the long-term underlying 
information structure rather than the temporary momentum in information structure shock.  
In terms of performance outcomes, Tobin’s Q is used as the measure of firm value. 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of common equity plus book value of debt divided 
by the book value of total assets, in this case at the end of 2006. The Tobin’s Q ratio is the 
most common firm performance measurement in empirical corporate governance research 
(Anderson et al. 2009; Bruno and Claessens 2007; Morck et al. 1988). Compared with 
accounting ratios that reflect historic performance of the firm, such as return on capital 
employed and return on assets, Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking evaluation that may be 
particularly sensitive to information opacity associated with managerial opportunism (Coff, 
1999). Bearing in mind that private information abuse risk primarily affects investor 
 
2. For example, market makers protect themselves from information asymmetry by simultaneously manipulating both the 
quoted bid and ask prices along with the quoted depths associated with those prices. Unless research design allows for the 
simultaneous choice of depths, the spread-based analyses are incomplete and difficult to interpret. For more detailed 
discussion, see Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1994). 
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perception of firm value and is more forward-looking by its nature, Tobin’s Q provides a 
much more appropriate measure in the context of our research.   
We used a number of variables that are associated with family control. First, data on 
ownership are central to this study, and were obtained from a variety of sources, including the 
directors’ biography in companies’ annual reports, WorldScope, the OSIRIS ownership tree, 
and information on major shareholder provided by the Bank of China (Hong Kong)-Qianlong 
database. Given the high concentration of family owned firms in Hong Kong, the measure of 
ownership is defined as the equity holding of the largest individual shareholder and close 
family. Following Claessens et al. (2000) and Filatotchev et al. (2005) the membership of the 
controlling family is identified by linking corporate insiders including CEO, board members, 
board chairman, honorary chairman and vice chairman that share a common family and 
second name with the largest owner. Having identified the family of the largest shareholder, 
we investigate the shareholding of every individual member and sum these to define the total 
ownership of each family. In addition to the share ownership stakes directly owned by the 
controlling family we also included stakes owned by outside firms that were controlled by the 
same family. The latter allowed us to account for an ownership pyramid effect that may 
increase families’ voting power beyond the limits of their immediate share ownership (see 
Zingales, 1995, for a discussion of this issue). 
To measure family control over the board, two variables were used. First, to capture the 
critical bargaining power of the largest family, a Family Board Dominance dummy (FBDD) is 
equal to 1 if the number of family members on the board is more than the number of 
independent directors in board, and 0 otherwise. According to HKSE listing rules, the 
independent directors are those without any connection to the largest family shareholders and 
without any business connection to the company. Second, a Family Leadership dummy 
(FACD) is equal to 1 if both CEO and Chairman of the board are classified as the members of 
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the largest controlling family using the common family and second name criteria and zero 
otherwise.  
To avoid spurious correlation, we used a number of control variables. These include: a 
founding family dummy, total board size, ownership of directors who are not from the largest 
family, market capitalisation of common equity, share liquidity measured by the average 
monthly trading volume, the daily return risk (standard deviation in share prices), sales 
revenue, sales growth, leverage, return on equity capital (ROE), firm age (the number of years 
listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange) and financial analysts’ coverage (the number of the 
first year forward EPS estimates available from I/B/E/S). Industry effects are controlled by 
dummies associated with 2 digit SIC codes.  
RESULTS  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used and Table 2 provides the 
correlation matrix. As Table 1 indicates, in terms of private information abuse risk, the mean 
possibility of private-information based trading is 0.30, which means that on average 30 
percent of the trades in HKSE convey private information. Easley et al. (2002) find that on 
average 19 percent of the trades on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) convey private 
information with 33.1 percent of the private information event days conveying negative 
private information. Compared with the findings from the NYSE, there is not only a higher 
overall private information abuse risk on HKSE, but also a higher probability that private 
information event days are associated with negative private information (50.8 percent). The 
relative intensity of trading by informed investors can be measured by the ratio of the arrival 
rate of informed trades over the arrival rate of uninformed orders. On the NYSE, the relative 
intensity of informed trading is 1.34 (Easley et al., 2002). On the HKSE, our calculations 
show that the relative intensity of informed trading is 1.90. These differences between the 
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HKSE and the NYSE are consistent with the characteristics of Hong Kong as a market with 
weaker investor protection, a less litigious environment and less rigorous disclosure policies 
(Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2005; Claessens and Fan 2002).  It also has a more relative 
intensity of informed trading and more private information abuse risk than the US. Therefore, 
there is a higher level of private information abuse risk faced by minority shareholders in the 
Hong Kong market.  
<Table 1 here> 
In terms of ownership structure, 361 or 80.76 percent of the sample firms are controlled 
by the family. On average, the largest family controls 39.49 percent of the outstanding 
shareholdings. This is higher than findings reported by Claessens et al. (2000) for a sample of 
330 firms listed in Hong Kong, for which there are two explanations.  First, since 1997 more 
family-controlled companies from Mainland China were listed in Hong Kong. Second, our 
approach based on directors’ biographies, supplemented by multiple sources of ownership 
information, improves the identification of family membership. When we examined the 
distribution of family ownership concentration it appears that family shareholdings between 
0–20 percent, 20–35 percent and over 35 percent are found in 5.82 percent, 11.86 percent and 
63.08 percent of firms in the sample, respectively. Therefore, compared with other Asian 
countries, the percentage of companies controlled by largest family shareholders in Hong 
Kong is extremely high.  
In terms of general board characteristics, in 233 companies or 52.13 percent of the 
sample, the largest family shareholders take the leadership role in both management and board 
by controlling both CEO and Board Chairman, which is similar to the findings of Claessens et 
al. (2000), who found a similar figure of 53.4 percent. In our sample, 42 companies or 9.40 
percent of the total have boards totally dominated by the largest family (e.g., family directors 
have a majority of seats on the Board, and both a CEO and a Chairman are family members).  
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Table 2 shows that largest family’s ownership and family board dominance are positively 
correlated with private information abuse risk, while private information abuse risk is 
negatively correlated with firm performance. Such correlations suggest that largest family 
shareholders’ control is more likely to stimulate increased private information abuse risk and 
this can lead to a decrease in firm performance, as predicted. Table 2 also shows some high 
correlations between independent variables which may cause the multicollinearity problems. 
However, these variables are used separately in different regression models, thus 
multicollinearity does not present concerns.  
<Table 2 here> 
Table 3 reports results of hierarchical regressions. Model A includes controls only, and in 
Models B to C we introduce governance-related explanatory variables in a stepwise fashion. 
As Model B shows, there is a significant positive relationship between the largest family 
shareholder’s ownership and overall private information abuse risk level, suggesting that 
when owning more equity family shareholders create greater information opacity, supporting 
hypothesis 1.  
Although there is no significant relationship between family board dominance and overall 
private information abuse risk in Model C, this relationships becomes positive and significant 
in Model D, when both family board dominance and family leadership are included in the 
model. Here, family leadership is significantly and negatively related to overall private 
information abuse risk. These findings suggest that the family board dominance and family 
leadership are different dimensions of family board characteristics. Without discriminating 
between these differences, the results of family board control on private information abuse 
risk may be ambiguous. Overall, hypothesis 2 is supported. Model D also suggests that the 
largest family’s board leadership mitigates disclosure distortion associated with managers 
hired from outside the family, supporting hypothesis 3. The adjusted R-squared improves by 
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10.57 percent in Model D compared to Model A, suggesting that corporate governance 
variables explain a substantial proportion of private information abuse risk. 
In terms of control variables, Table 3 indicates that the largest family shareholders’ 
founder status is negatively associated with overall private information abuse risk. It seems 
that factors associated with their prestige and historical links with the firm may better align 
their interests with other minority shareholders and mitigate the extent of opportunistic 
opacity, ultimately leading to lower private information abuse risk. This finding is consistent 
with previous research suggesting that the founding family is associated with lower abnormal 
accruals, greater earnings informativeness, and less persistence of transitory loss components 
in earnings (Wang 2006) as well as with higher valuation than similar firms without founding 
family control (Kang 1998; McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra, 1998). The result 
also shows that private information abuse risk is higher in small firms and in firms with lower 
stock market liquidity. These results are consistent with Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara 
(2007), who indicate that smaller firms have less transparency and that those with limited 
trading activity tend to be less attractive to uninformed investors. Firms with higher daily 
return volatility have lower private information abuse risk, suggesting that higher potential 
returns may lead to an increase in speculative activity by uninformed investors. 
<Table 3 here> 
Table 4 reports the effects of private information abuse risk on firm performance (Tobin’s 
Q). To explore possible direct effects of corporate governance on performance, Model E 
provides regression results using all governance variables from Table 3, plus controls. This 
model clearly indicates that there is no significant direct relationship between family control 
and firm performance. However, there is a significant negative relationship between private 
information abuse risk and firm performance in Model F, suggesting that although largest 
family shareholders’ opportunistic or strategic considerations do not affect performance 
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directly, they can provide an indirect effect using private information abuse risk as a 
transmission mechanism. Therefore, the overall governance effects of largest family 
shareholders within the context of private information abuse risk are related to the firm’s 
information opacity and the extraction of private benefits of control. These effects are 
recognized by the stock market participants leading to a reduction in Tobin’s Q. Therefore, 
hypothesis 4 is supported.  
<Table 4 here> 
However, informed trading transactions incorporate both market-wide and firm-level 
private information into the share price (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2002; Bardong, 
Bartram and Yadav, 2008). Market-wide private information generates co-movements of 
share prices (Roll 1988), and this risk factor leads to discounted prices equally across firms. 
The firm-level component of private information abuse risk reflects intentionally distorted 
disclosure by managers and/or a lack of scrutiny by investors and market intermediaries 
(Anderson et al. 2009). The controlling shareholders may be exploiting diminished 
transparency or opacity by extracting personal benefits at the expense of investors’ ignorance.  
Bearing in mind the above arguments, we expect investors to put a bigger discount on this 
part of private information abuse risk than total private information abuse risk. In Model G we 
used two stage least square (2SLS) regression with the fitted values of PIN obtained from 
Model D in Table 3 (see Pagan, 1984, for a discussion of this methodology). Market-wide 
private information, which is common across all listed firms, is captured in the error term and 
thus removed from the explained component of private information abuse risk. Results in 
Model G show that the fitted private information abuse risk has a significant and stronger 
negative effect on firm performance compared to the overall private information abuse risk 
that also contains market wide private information abuse risk. This stronger negative relation 
between the explained private information abuse risk and firm performance suggests that 
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investors place greater valuation discounts on the firm-level governance-related proportion of 
private information abuse risk than the total private information abuse risk that includes 
market-wide risks.  
Finally, in Model H we included all governance variables, explained PIN and controls. 
These regression results are a significant contrast to the results in Model E. Model H suggests 
that, after controlling for explained private information abuse risk, family control over 
ownership and the board has a positive impact on performance. The firm-level explained 
private information abuse risk is still significantly and negatively associated with firm 
valuation, as predicted by our framework. 
These findings indicate potential differences in the wealth-generation and wealth- 
distribution governance roles of the controlling family, in line with the multiple-agency 
perspective on family control that we have developed in the theoretical part of the paper. If the 
firm was absolutely transparent to outside shareholders, they would put a premium on family 
control since the enhanced monitoring capacity of the family and their longer-term 
commitment to growth may mitigate principal-agent conflict and lead to an improvement in 
the firm’s rent generation capabilities. However, family control also leads to an increase in the 
firm’s opacity and aggravates principal-principal conflict between the family and minority 
shareholders. This conflict creates negative wealth distribution effects associated with 
opportunism by the family, as indicated by a significant negative sign for the explained PIN 
regression coefficient. Therefore, from the multiple-agency perspective, family ownership and 
board control create a governance trade-off when the effects of superior monitoring capacity 
of family shareholders are off-set by their impact on firm transparency. 
Our results show that family board leadership is negatively associated with firm 
performance after controlling for firm-level private information abuse risk. Previous empirical 
evidence on the governance roles of family leadership is mixed, and some research shows that 
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firms with family leaders trade at a premium relative to other firms (Adams, Almeida and 
Ferreira, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2008) while others show a negative relationship between these 
two factors (Smith and Amoako-Adu 1999). Again, our findings suggest there may be 
governance trade-offs associated with family control over firm leadership. By appointing 
family members as Chairman and CEO, the controlling family may reduce information abuse 
risk associated with opportunism of externally hired managers. A subsequent reduction in the 
expected PIN signals to investors that their wealth is better protected leading to an increase in 
Tobin’s Q. However, by promoting family members to top board positions, the controlling 
shareholders reduce the professionalization of the firm that is associated with externally 
appointed managers. Some researchers suggests that using family human resources results in 
lower wealth-creating capability by limiting organisational learning, entrepreneurship and 
innovation (Schulze et al. 2001; Singell and Thornton 1997). This focus on internal sources of 
managerial talent may reduce the rent generation capability of the firm, and this is reflected in 
a fall in Tobin’s Q. Thus, when making decisions about the professionalization of the firm, the 
largest family shareholders face a dilemma between more competent, externally hired 
professional managers who may increase the risk of information distortion, and potentially 
less talented managers from inside the family who present a lower information abuse risk. 
Facing such a trade-off, large family shareholders in Hong Kong seem to prefer to appoint 
their own leaders. Our data suggest that in 52.13% of the sample, the largest family 
shareholders prefer a strong board leadership role.  
Finally, we also included in Model H interactions of the expected PIN with all 
governance variables. Our results (not reported here) show, family ownership and leadership 
(board dominance) negatively (positively) moderate the impact of the expected private 
information abuse risk variable E[PIN]. This suggests that wealth-protecting effects of family 
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control may be higher when private information abuse risks are relatively low, in line with our 
general arguments. 
 In terms of controls, Table 4 indicates that larger and older firms have a lower Tobin’s Q 
compared to their smaller and younger peers. Tobin’s Q is also positively affected by firm 
growth, and negatively affected by past ROE. This initially appears to be counter-intuitive 
although it is established in the literature that reversion to the mean is the most powerful 
effect in investment finance. That is, in most circumstances, investors buy low-profitability 
companies and sell high-profitability ones and thus there is tendency for the market to 
converge (Fama and French, 2000; Knapp, Gart and Chaudhry, 2006).  Overall, as Table 4 
shows, by including factors associated with the two governance roles of controlling families 
there is a substantial increase in the adjusted R-squared in Model H compared to Model E. 
DISCUSSION 
Corporate transparency is an important but controversial issue in corporate governance and 
strategy research (Verrecchia 2001). Higher transparency protects shareholder value and 
reduces the cost of capital for the firm, but too much transparency may lead to the leakage of 
strategic information that harms long term competitive advantage. How diverse objectives of 
different stakeholders and corporate governance factors affect efficiency trade-offs associated 
with information disclosure represents a relatively unexplored area within the economics and 
management literature, and this paper attempts to answer this important question.  
Although previous research on corporate governance in emerging markets has identified 
the importance of private benefits of control, which are often associated with the powerful 
position of concentrated shareholders, our understanding of specific mechanisms of rent 
extraction by controlling shareholders is limited. In particular, their influence on private 
information abuse risk and firm opacity to the external investment community is unclear.  
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This paper examines how control of the largest family influences overall private information 
abuse risk, and how this affects performance. It contributes to previous research by providing 
empirical evidence that links family control and firm performance through the perspective of 
private information abuse risk. We show that family ownership and family board dominance 
increase private information abuse risk in the stock market. By increasing firm opacity 
controlling families may create opportunities to abuse their dominant position at the expense 
of minority shareholders, following Anderson et al. (2009).  
This study also extends the nascent theoretical emphasis on multiple agency theory 
(Arthurs et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2009). We consider the heterogeneity of investors by 
examining the impact of both principal-agent and principal-principal conflicts on information 
risk. We show that corporate governance factors associated with family control may play a 
dual role. Controlling families may mitigate private information abuse risk associated with 
managerial opportunism. At the same time, they may be tempted to increase information 
opacity in order to extract the private benefits of control at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Therefore, information disclosure is associated with important governance 
trade-offs when controlling shareholders attempt to offset their personal costs of disclosure 
with the benefits of a potential reduction in the cost of capital of the firm. Our analysis helps 
to disentangle conflicting objectives of family shareholders and their effects on performance. 
It shows that families may play dual governance roles by supporting long-term wealth 
generation on one hand, and engaging in an opportunistic wealth distribution in an 
environment of corporate opacity on the other. This analysis supports theoretical arguments 
by Coff (1999) and helps to explain conflicting evidence on family control in the agency and 
strategy literatures (Anderson et al. 2003; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; 
Holderness and Dennis 1988; McConaughy et al. 1998). 
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Similarly, controlling families also create a governance trade-off when choosing to be 
actively involved in managing the firm. By appointing an outside CEO and Chairman, the 
controlling family may face an increased risk of managerial opportunism associated with 
information distortion. However, when these external leaders are replaced by family 
members, the firm becomes less professional, and our analysis shows that in emerging 
markets this lack of professionalism causes a reduction in performance. Our data indicate that 
largest family shareholders in Hong Kong prefer their own leadership to improve transparency 
despite the fact that it reduces investors’ evaluation of the firm. Overall, our findings are in 
line with research by Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) who suggest that, in addition to 
internationally accepted good practice principals and standards of disclosure, policy makers 
and regulators in emerging markets should also consider the effects of firm-level governance 
factors on disclosure incentives.  
Future Research  
Our findings indicate a rich set of future research possibilities. For example, we suggest that 
agency problems may vary across different national settings and imply that researchers should 
integrate the agency framework with institutional analysis to generate robust predictions 
(Bruton et al., 2010). Future research should expand on this concept and seek to explicitly 
examine the nature of agency conflicts and their implications in different institutional settings. 
Our analysis is focused on a single stock market, and future research should verify where our 
findings can be replicated in other emerging economies such as India, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia. Countries in the early stages of industrialisation are defined by the immaturity of 
their securities markets, with family block holders and business networks playing a prominent 
role in the corporate landscape (Filatotchev et al., 2007). Although previous research 
acknowledges the importance of ownership structure on performance in these countries (e.g., 
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Claessens et al., 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2005), little is known about the inter-relationships 
between corporate governance and information disclosure.  
 In addition, we have focused on corporate governance factors associated with family 
control. However, many listed companies in emerging markets also have non-family 
investors, including domestic financial institutions, foreign investors and the state. Therefore, 
a more refined analysis of possible effects of different groups of outside investors would be 
useful for a better understanding of factors affecting information disclosure in emerging 
markets. For example, is state ownership associated with an increased level of corporate 
opacity? Do foreign investors “export” good corporate governance in terms of better disclosure 
and reporting? Future research should address these important questions.  
Conclusions 
During the current prolonged recession, corporate scandals and the collapse of financial 
services firms have resulted in a return to an interest in the kind of values prevalent in 
family-owned companies. Family-controlled firms that survived their own internal succession 
dramas are often portrayed as businesses that take a longer-term view rather than an 
inclination to live and die by stock market evaluation of their performance. Our analysis 
indicates that in reality the corporate governance effects of family control are more 
complicated than was previously thought. In terms of corporate disclosure, the dominant 
position of family owners in emerging markets leads to a number of efficiency trade-offs, and 
future research should aim to disentangle complex conflicts within multiple agency 
framework associated with family control.
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Table 1 Error! Bookmark not defined.Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Private Information Abuse Risk, Corporate Opacity Structure and Their Components  
PIN 0.30 0.13 0.08 0.84 
Family Ownership Variables 
Largest Family’s Ownership 39.49 24.81 0 89.64 
Family Founder Status Dummy* 31.77 -- 0 1 
Family Board Control Variables 
Family Board Dominance Dummy* 9.40 -- 0 1 
Family Leadership Dummy* 52.13 -- 0 1 
Board Size 8.90 2.79 5 21 
Non-Family Directors’ Ownership 1.25 2.61 0 25.5 
Firm Performance  
Tobin’s Q  1.57 2.70 0.20 25.84 
Control Variables 
Ln MV 21.00 1.96 17.11 27.93 
Ln Sale 20.52 1.93 14.19 26.39 
Ln Liquidity 13.79 1.98 7.86 20.12 
Daily Return Volatility 12.85 9.56 1.75 74.77 
Leverage 19.67 18.33 0 110.66 
ROE 0.07 1.62 -21.34 17.58 
Growth 0.60 3.35 -1.00 53.58 
Ln Analyst Coverage 3.19 6.04 0 34 
Ln Firm Age 12.55 8.12 1 35 
 
Notes: for dummy variables, the percentage of the sample is reported in the mean column. N=447. 
 
Table 2. Correlations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1.Tobin’s Q 1.00                 
2.PIN -0.11 [<0.01] 1.00                
3.Largest Family’s Ownership -0.01 [0.81] 
0.22 
[<0.01] 1.00               
4.Family Founder Status 
Dummy 
0.01 
[0.85] 
0.05 
[0.31] 
0.30 
[<0.01] 1.00              
5.Family Leadership Dummy -0.04 [0.32] 
0.02 
[0.61] 
0.32 
[<0.01] 
0.26 
[<0.01] 1.00             
6.Family Board Dominance 
Dummy 
-0.07 
[0.10] 
0.17 
[<0.01] 
0.17 
[<0.01] 
0.11 
[0.02] 
0.25 
[<0.01] 1.00            
7.Ln Board Size -0.10 [0.02] 
-0.22 
[<0.01] 
-0.20 
[<0.01] 
-0.16 
[<0.01] 
-0.24 
[<0.01] 
0.09 
[0.05] 1.00           
8.Non-Family Directors’ 
Ownership 
-0.03 
[0.47] 
-0.01 
[0.88] 
-0.17 
[<0.01] 
-0.02 
[0.68] 
-0.16 
[<0.01] 
-0.09 
[0.05] 
0.12 
[0.01] 1.00          
9.Ln Market Capitalization 0.10 [0.02] 
-0.47 
[<0.01] 
-0.14 
[<0.01] 
-0.14 
[<0.01] 
-0.09 
[0.07] 
-0.09 
[0.06] 
0.50 
[<0.01] 
-0.004 
[0.92] 1.00         
10. Ln Sale -0.28 [<0.01] 
-0.29 
[<0.01] 
-0.15 
[<0.01] 
0.01 
[0.80] 
-0.04 
[0.39] 
-0.02 
[0.58] 
0.47 
[<0.01] 
0.03 
[0.46] 
0.64 
[<0.01] 1.00        
11.Ln Share Liquidity 0.20 [<0.01] 
-0.43 
[<0.01] 
-0.26 
[<0.01] 
-0.13 
[<0.01] 
-0.22 
[<0.01] 
-0.21 
[<0.01] 
0.11 
[0.01] 
0.004 
[0.92] 
0.30 
[<0.01] 
0.12 
[<0.01] 1.00       
12. Daily Return Risk 0.19 [<0.01] 
0.02 
[0.65] 
-0.02 
[0.52] 
-0.07 
[0.10] 
-0.04 
[0.36] 
-0.12 
[<0.01] 
-0.33 
[<0.01] 
-0.02 
[0.68] 
-0.41 
[<0.01] 
-0.41 
[<0.01] 
0.11 
[0.01] 1.00      
13. Growth 0.31 [<0.01] 
-0.06 
[0.19] 
0.07 
[0.10] 
0.004 
[0.93] 
0.01 
[0.81] 
-0.05 
[0.26] 
-0.03 
[0.47] 
-0.01 
[0.71] 
0.05 
[0.27] 
-0.23 
[<0.01] 
0.06 
[0.15] 
0.06 
[0.16] 1.00     
14. Ln Firm Age -0.08 [0.06] 
-0.05 
[0.28] 
-0.03 
[0.44] 
-0.20 
[<0.01] 
-0.04 
[0.38] 
0.12 
[<0.01] 
0.20 
[<0.01] 
-0.04 
[0.30] 
0.16 
[<0.01] 
0.04 
[0.35] 
-0.05 
[0.21] 
-0.06 
[0.15] 
0.03 
[0.40] 1.00    
15. Ln Analyst Coverage 0.09 [0.04] 
-0.42 
[<0.01] 
-0.20 
[<0.01] 
-0.08 
[0.08] 
-0.04 
[0.32] 
-0.11 
[0.01] 
0.43 
[<0.01] 
0.03 
[0.47] 
0.80 
[<0.01] 
0.56 
[<0.01] 
0.34 
[<0.01] 
-0.28 
[<0.01] 
0.07 
[0.13] 
-0.03 
[0.52] 1.00   
16. Leverage 0.001 [0.97] 
-0.13 
[<0.01] 
0.02 
[0.58] 
-0.04 
[0.38] 
-0.09 
[0.03] 
-0.08 
[0.06] 
0.03 
[0.45] 
-0.005 
[0.90] 
0.006 
[0.88] 
0.04 
[0.39] 
0.14 
[<0.01] 
0.03 
[0.47] 
0.07 
[0.12] 
0.01 
[0.68] 
0.03 
[0.45] 1.00  
17. ROE -0.12 [0.01] 
-0.12 
[<0.01] 
0.01 
[0.74] 
0.0006 
[0.99] 
-0.02 
[0.65] 
0.02 
[0.54] 
0.12 
[0.01] 
0.03 
[0.44] 
0.18 
[<0.01] 
0.19 
[<0.01] 
0.06 
[0.14] 
-0.06 
[0.15] 
0.005 
[0.90] 
0.03 
[0.49] 
0.13 
[<0.01] 
0.01 
[0.82] 1.00 
 
 
N=447.
 Table 3. Factors Affecting Private Information Abuse Risk 
 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
 PIN PIN PIN PIN 
Largest Family’s Founder Status 
Dummy  
-0.06 
[-1.37] 
-0.09** 
[-2.07] 
-0.09** 
[-2.21] 
-0.08* 
[-1.85] 
Ln Board Size  -0.04 
[-0.78] 
-0.02 
[0.27] 
-0.03 
[-0.74] 
-0.07 
[-1.50] 
Non Family Directors’ 
Ownership  
-0.01 
[-0.14] 
0.01 
[0.27] 
0.02 
[0.41] 
0.004 
[0.12] 
Ln Firm Market Capitalization  -0.39*** 
[-5.26] 
-0.41*** 
[-5.53] 
-0.40*** 
[-5.37] 
-0.40*** 
[-5.40] 
Ln Share Liquidity  -0.30*** 
[-7.21] 
-0.28*** 
[-6.60] 
-0.27*** 
[-6.40] 
-0.29*** 
[-6.86] 
Daily Return Volatility  -0.11*** 
[-2.52] 
-0.11*** 
[-2.52] 
-0.11** 
[-2.41] 
-0.11*** 
[-2.50] 
Growth 0.02 
[0.60] 
0.01 
[0.37] 
0.02 
[0.44] 
0.02 
[0.44] 
Ln Firm Age  -0.04 
[-0.90] 
-0.03 
[-0.88] 
-0.04 
[-1.00] 
-0.04 
[-0.98] 
Ln Analysts Coverage  -0.10 
[-1.40] 
-0.08 
[-1.13] 
-0.08 
[-1.12] 
-0.05 
[-0.74] 
ROE 0.01 
[0.14] 
0.001 
[0.08] 
-0.001 
[-0.02] 
-0.004 
[-0.12] 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Largest Family’s Ownership   0.12*** 
[2.80] 
0.11*** 
[2.70] 
0.13*** 
[3.26] 
Family Board Dominance 
Dummy 
  0.06 
[1.50] 
0.09** 
[2.20] 
Family Leadership Dummy     -0.14*** 
[-3.31] 
Adj R-squared 0.380 0.399 0.40 0.42 
△R-squared (in total), % --- 1.90 2.00 4.00 
△R-squared (step by step), % -- 1.90 0.001 2.00 
 
Note: All coefficients are standardized; *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; t-statistics in parentheses. N=447. 
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Table 4. Error! Bookmark not defined.The Effects of Private Information Abuse Risk on 
the Firm’s Performance 
 
 
Note: All coefficients are standardized; *p≤0.10; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; t-statistics in parentheses. N=447. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model E Model F Model G Model H 
 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
PIN --- -0.23*** 
[-6.01] 
--- --- 
E[PIN] --- --- -0.49*** 
[-13.04] 
-0.63*** 
[-14.82] 
Largest Family Ownership  -0.001 
[-0.04] 
--- --- 0.20*** 
[5.62] 
Family Board Dominance Dummy  -0.08 
[-1.99] 
--- --- 0.11** 
[3.12] 
Family Leadership Dummy -0.05 
[-1.25] 
--- --- -0.18*** 
[-5.24] 
Largest Family’s Founder Status 
Dummy  
0.01 
[0.13] 
--- --- -0.01 
[-0.29] 
Ln Board Size 0.08 
[1.86] 
--- --- -0.05** 
[-1.25] 
Non Family Directors’ Ownership -0.02 
[-0.52] 
--- --- 0.02 
[0.68] 
Ln Sale -0.14*** 
[-3.07] 
-0.17*** 
[-4.42] 
-0.35*** 
[-9.10] 
-0.37*** 
[-9.48] 
Leverage 0.01 
[0.26] 
0.01 
[0.29] 
0.03 
[0.86] 
0.01 
[0.22] 
ROE -0.08** 
[-2.30] 
-0.09** 
[-2.53] 
-0.10*** 
[-3.27] 
-0.12*** 
[-4.05] 
Growth 0.15*** 
[4.09] 
0.14*** 
[3.91] 
0.08*** 
[2.66] 
0.07** 
[2.20] 
Ln Firm Age -0.10*** 
[-2.60] 
-0.10*** 
[-2.82] 
-0.12*** 
[-3.72] 
-0.13*** 
[-4.09] 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared 0.131 0.188 0.373 0.431 
△R-squared (in total), % --- 5.70 24.20 30.00 
△R-squared (step by step), % --- 5.70 18.50 5.80 
